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RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCIES THROUGH
PRIVATE ORDERING
Robert K. Rasmussen*

There is no international bankruptcy law. No question, there are
international insolvencies. Transnational firms, just like domestic
ones, often cannot generate sufficient revenue to satisfy their debt ob
ligations. Their financial distress creates a situation where assets and
claimants are scattered across more than one country. But there is no
international law that provides a set of rules for resolving the financial
distress of these firms. The absence of any significant free-standing
international bankruptcy treaty means that a domestic court con
fronted with the domestic part of a transnational enterprise has to de
cide which nation's domestic bankruptcy law will apply to which as
sets. To the extent that one wants to talk about an "international
bankruptcy law," it is nothing more than the question of when, as a
matter of domestic law, a court will resolve a dispute according to the
law of another country rather than its own nation's bankruptcy law.
International bankruptcy law as it currently exists is thus, in reality,
domestic bankruptcy law. The challenge for each nation's domestic
law in this area is to mediate the tensions that arise because the firm
and its creditors are spread across more than one jurisdiction. This
question becomes difficult in large measure because each country's
domestic bankruptcy laws diverge. Such divergence is not surprising.
Bankruptcy laws address a myriad of discrete questions. At a mini
mum, the bankruptcy laws of each nation must specify who will decide
the future deployment of the insolvent firm's assets, who will own
these assets after the proceeding ends, and who will run the firm while
all these matters are being sorted out. Scholars exploring the best way
to address these questions have provided a number of conceptually
coherent theories,1 yet they have not come to a consensus on the "cor-

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1982, Loyola, Chicago; J.D. 1985,
University of Chicago. - Ed. John Goldberg, Andrew Guzman, Lynn LoPucki, David
Skeel, and Fred Tung provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this piece. I am
also grateful to Laina Reinsmith for excellent research assistance.

1. For an overview of the current state of bankruptcy theory, see Douglas G. Baird,
(1998).

Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573
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rect" bankruptcy law - and, even if they had, there is little reason to
think that the actual political process would embrace this consensus.2
Thus, bankruptcy laws differ across nations. We would expect
such differences to exist even if all countries agreed that the sole pur
pose of such laws was to resolve the problems caused by financial dis
tress in the most efficient manner. To be a bit more concrete, perhaps
the fundamental question confronting a bankruptcy system concerned
with efficiency is how to determine whether a firm in financial distress
should be liquidated or reorganized. Some domestic bankruptcy laws
guard against inefficient attempts to keep the firm going, while others
protect against premature liquidation.3 These countries agree that the
goal is to promote efficiency by liquidating those firms in economic
distress but reorganizing those that are suffering from only financial,
as opposed to economic distress. The rub is they disagree on how to
get there. Indeed, scholars who embrace efficiency as the sole goal of
bankruptcy law have yet to reach consensus on the optimal bank
ruptcy system.4
These differences among the world's bankruptcy regimes are exac
erbated by the fact that while any insolvency law reflects some con
cern with efficiency, other interests, such as redistribution to favored
groups, shape the final legislative product.5 These choices reflect dif
ferent, often conflicting, policy judgments about which group or
groups should be favored in the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Some
countries provide extra protection to current employees, others to cer
tain other creditors. Some nations treat tort victims on a par with con
sensual unsecured creditors, and others grant them even lower prior
ity.
The problem that arises when a transnational firm becomes insol
vent presents a basic choice-of-law problem: How should law recon
cile these differing decisions?

Some of these reflect differing judg-

2. For background on the political dynamics that have shaped American bankruptcy
law, see Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REV. 47 (1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of
American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evo
lutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1323,
1350-79 (1998).
3. See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S. - European
Comparison, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 467
(Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
4. Compare Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11 (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), with Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993), Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 51 (1992)
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice], and Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach
to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE LJ. 1807 (1998).
5. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J.
437, 467-74 (1992).
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ments as to how to implement the same goal, others stem from a dis
agreement over the goals themselves. Commentators have proposed
three general approaches to reconcile these conflicts: universalism,
which comes in varying degrees;6 territorialism;7 and contractualism.8
Universalism posits that a single country's reorganization laws
should govern the insolvency of a transnational firm. The system de
pends on countries agreeing to a set of choice of law rules that identify
the "home" country of the transnational firm. The home country ad
ministers the insolvency proceeding. Territorialism, in contrast, allows
each country to administer the assets that it finds within its borders ac
cording to its own domestic bankruptcy law. Finally, contractualism
allows each independent corporate entity to specify in its corporate
charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bankruptcy proceeding in
volving that entity.9 The transnational firm under a bankruptcy selec
tion regime could thus opt for a universalist approach - by having all
of its constituent entities select the same jurisdiction to govern bank
ruptcy proceedings - or for a territorialist approach - by having all
of its entities select the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated. It
could even adopt a mixed approach under which a subset of the firm's
entities would be administered in one jurisdiction while the remainder
would be handled where they were incorporated.
The main justification for universalism has been an economic one.
Its proponents, the most effective of whom have been Professors Jay
Westbrook and Andrew Guzman, suggest that it will lead to more ef
ficient investments and, on average, promise a greater return to the
creditors of the insolvent firm.10 The main proponent of territorialism,
Professor Lynn LoPucki, suggests that the economic justification of
fered for universalism falls suspect, particularly because it is impossi-

6. A good description of these variations can be found in Lynn M. LoPucki, Coopera·
CORNELL L. REV. 696,

tion in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach, 84
704-06, 725-28, 732-33 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation].

7.

See id.

at 742-50.

8. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 32-35 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach].
9. Professor Westbrook asserts that the approach I have advocated for domestic bank
ruptcy law - allowing firms to select reorganization regimes - devolves into nothing more
than a security interest. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Global Solution to Multinational
Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2303-05 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, The Global Solu
tion]. My approach, however, allows debtors to select from competing bankruptcy systems,
such as Chapter 11, an auction system, or state default law. Indeed, the menu I propose
would include all those systems that could plausibly best steer a firm through financial dis
tress. Certainly Professor Westbrook does not think that Chapter 11 is similar to a security
interest. Thus, I fail to understand why a firm selecting a bankruptcy is a security interest; it
certainly is not a security interest when it is imposed on firms by the state.
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Trans·
national Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law & Choice of Forums, 65 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 457, 464-71 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism].
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ble to design a system that can implement universalism in a coherent
manner.11 Professor LoPucki now endorses the holy grail of the uni
versalists - a single law administered by a single court - but insists
that territorialism should reign in the interregnum.12
One could also mount a noneconomic argument against univer
salism; namely, that it fails to respect the bankruptcy policies of the
different countries involved. This argument relies on a principle of na
tional self-determination and posits that each country ought to be free
to pursue its own policies through its bankruptcy law. Any credible
theory of how to handle transnational insolvencies must wrestle with
the problem of comity between sovereign nations.
Allowing firms to specify the relevant bankruptcy forum through a
provision in their corporate charter is, like universalism, premised on
efficiency grounds.13 The justification for the contractual approach
begins with the assumption that some firms are better off with a terri
torial system, others with a universalist model, still others with a mix
ture of the two. Faced with this heterogeneity of types of firms, the
main argument for the contractual approach is that firms ex ante,
rather than courts ex post or legislatures ex ante, can best decide
which regime is better for them. The one constraint on firm choice is
that the ability to change a choice already made has to be constrained
so as to guard against opportunistic change.14 Like universalism, how
ever, contractualism can be subject to the twin attacks that it cannot
be implemented in a satisfactory manner15 and that it fails to take ac
count of comity concerns.
This essay addresses the points of contention among these theo
ries, and endeavors to further the debate by explaining that bank
ruptcy selection clauses can perform better from an economic perspec
tive than can either of its rivals, and by considering the noneconomic
issues that some may offer as a reason to adhere to territorialism. The
essay first examines the question, raised by Professor LoPucki, re
garding which of the three systems promises the greatest efficiency. It
then responds to Professor LoPucki's concern that enforcement of
bankruptcy selection clauses would create "debtor havens" that design
their laws so as to transfer wealth from small creditors to the debtor
and large creditors. Finally, the essay closes by responding to the ar-

11. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 709-36.
12 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2222 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality].
13. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 4.
14. See infra

text accompanying notes 39-40.

15. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 738-42 .
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gument that both universalism and the bankruptcy selection clause
system frustrate the fulfillment of national policy.16
I.

EFFICIENCY AND TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES

All the participants in the debate over transnational insolvencies
claim that their approach is the most (economically) efficient. Indeed,
to date, this is the primary claim of both the universalist and bank
ruptcy selection clause approaches, both of which have yet to even as
sert that they respect the noneconomic decisions reflected in domestic
bankruptcy law.17 The exploration of the force of these efficiency
claims, as well as of the argument that neither system can be imple
mented in a way that would generate its purported benefits, requires
the delineation of the theoretical arguments in favor of the universalist
and bankruptcy selection clause approaches. Because territorialism
has been the de facto approach to transnational insolvencies for years,
each system starts with that baseline and attempts to demonstrate that
a shift away from territorialism holds the promise of gains.
It is easiest to start with universalism, which has long been the sys
tem of choice among academics. The advocates of universalism iden
tify two ways that a universalist system would promote greater effi
ciency than a territorial system. First, universalism would discourage
inefficient investment. As Professors Bebchuk and Guzman have
pointed out, territoriality raises the possibility that a debtor will invest
in a new country even when such an investment has a negative net
present value.18 This result relies crucially on the premise that the new
country will give priority to that country's creditors, who may have ex
tended credit more recently than have creditors in another country.
This priority accorded to the new debt effectively places some of the
downside risk of the new project on the preexisting creditors in an
other country. This placement of risk on the old creditors provides an
incentive for the debtor to borrow funds from the new lender who, ex
pecting greater bankruptcy returns from a territorialist regime, will of
fer a lower interest rate for an investment in that country. This incen
tive can lead a firm to invest in a country with a territorial regime even
if an investment in a different country has a greater expected value.

16. Professor LoPucki has made another attack on the universalist model - that no one
has specified a workable universalist system. See id. at 709-25, 728-32, 734-36. Given that I
reject the universalist model on other grounds, I remain agnostic on this issue.
17. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at passim (arguing for universalism on the
ground that it would produce efficient investment incentives); Rasmussen, A New Approach,
supra note 8, at 4; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 10, at 464-71. Territori
alism self-evidently respects the policy choices made by the domestic sovereign, but Profes
sor LoPucki's defense of this system is not premised on these grounds.
18. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at 787-89.
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Universalism combats this incentive by assuring creditors that the new
loan will be handled under the priority scheme of the home country.
Second, as articulated most fully by Professor Westbrook, univer
salism encourages reorganizations that have the potential to increase
the returns to creditors.19 It does so by combating the collective action
problem that is the general justification for domestic corporate bank
ruptcy law in the first instance.20 Specifically, left to their state law
remedies of seizing assets to satisfy their debts, individual creditors
will recognize when a debtor cannot pay off all of its debts in full, and
each will attempt to be the first to collect on its obligation. This incen
tive creates a race to the assets and a consequent liquidation of the
firm. This forced liquidation may be inefficient both because the as
sets may already be devoted to their highest valued use and because,
even if the firm should be liquidated, an orderly liquidation process
conducted by a single forum would bring higher returns than would a
piecemeal liquidation conducted by disparate jurisdictions. Bank
ruptcy law guards against this race by staying all nonbankruptcy col
lection efforts and forcing all claimants into the single bankruptcy fo
rum where they can, as a group, decide on the optimal deployment of
the firm's assets.
Professor Westbrook's justification for universalism parallels this
argument. Absent a single proceeding, creditors in each country
would have an incentive to grab the assets in that country. A world
wide reorganization of a transnational firm, according to the advocates
of universalism, would increase the value of the firm's assets. Univer
salism, just like domestic bankruptcy law, also promises savings by de
creasing the number of forums that would be needed to resolve a
firm's financial distress.
The theoretical arguments behind these purported gains are clear;
the extent to which any of these gains exist as a practical matter, how
ever, remains unclear. As to investment incentives, Bebchuk and
Guzman correctly identify a theoretical problem with the territorial
approach, but they fail to offer a convincing explanation as to why the
contracting parties cannot eliminate most of the problem through con
tract.21 Bankruptcy law, by specifying the distribution of an insolvent
firm's assets, affects the selection of a firm's investments.22 Professors

19. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 10,

20.

See

THOMAS H. JACKSON,

THE

at 465-66.

LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

7-19

(1986).

21. Also, their argument best justifies treating foreign creditors the same as national
creditors (so-called "national treatment"), a practice that almost all countries already follow.
See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 29.
22 See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 473 75 (1992); Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Re-
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Bebchuk and Guzman demonstrate how later lending can reduce the
expected return to the earlier creditor. In their model, a country fol
lows territorialism when it grants priority to creditors from that coun
try.23 This granting of priority has the effect of placing the risk of fail
ure of the new investment on the old creditors. If there are not
sufficient assets to pay all claims, domestic creditors get paid first. The
earlier creditor, of course, can anticipate this treatment, and price its
loan accordingly. The debtor still pays the same overall rate of inter
est - it is just that the earlier creditors charge a higher rate than they
otherwise would, and the later creditors a lower one.
The cost of this adjustment of interest rates induced by territorial
ism is that it creates an incentive to invest in the country that follows
territorialism in order to obtain the lower rate of interest. In other
words, firms would not select investments solely based on their ex
pected returns.
Viewed ex ante, debtors bear the cost of not investing in the most
promising projects. They thus would have an incentive to commit to
not engaging in this behavior. They would want to commit to invest
ing in projects that offer the greatest expected return.
Loan covenants in the original loan agreement could go a long way
toward this result. For example, a lending agreement could define, as
a default, any attempt to procure credit from abroad on terms that
would give the subsequent lender priority. The problem hypothesized
by Professors Bebchuk and Guzman is simply a variant of the problem
that arises whenever a firm with existing debt issues senior debt.
Lenders routinely insist on covenants to guard against this action.24
Indeed, taking a security interest is one mechanism for preventing the
priming of preexisting debt.25 Another mechanism is the negative
pledge clause, which prevents the debtor from incurring senior debt
without the permission of the earlier lender.26
To be sure, as Professors Bebchuk and Guzman argue,27 contrac
tual solutions cannot eliminate totally the adverse incentive effects of
territorialism. Requiring creditor approval of foreign investments may
eliminate the risk of debtor opportunism but create the risk of creditor
opportunism. In cases where foreign investment is optimal, old credi
tors may insist on part of the gains in exchange for their consent.
form on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Alan Schwartz, The Abso/llte
Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994).

23.
24.
(1989).

See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10,
See

Alan Schwartz, A

at 788-89.

Theory of Loan Priorities,

18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-18

25. See id. at 228-34; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect
Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 236 (1992).
26.

See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 216-18.

27.

See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at 800-02.
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Creditor opportunism may be constrained by a creditor's desire to fos
ter a reputation for fair dealing with its borrowers and by the debtor's
ability to make alternative investments that do not require creditor
approval. Indeed, one observes the use of negative-pledge clauses de
spite the fact that they create the risk of opportunistic behavior by the
lender. Thus, contracts can limit the adverse incentive effects gener
ated by territorialism.
Stated differently, for the proponents of universalism to assert that
universalism will create better investment incentives, they must show
that territorialism generates inefficiencies that cannot be reduced
drastically through the adroit use of contract. After all, as Bebchuk
and Guzman recognize, creditors can price inefficient lending terms.28
Since debtors have the incentive to borrow money at the lowest rate
possible, they have the incentive to offer contracts that maximize the
contracting surplus between the contracting parties.29
If universalism cannot be justified entirely by the creation of supe
rior investment incentives, it must find justification on the grounds
that it will lead to a greater return to creditors through either global
reorganizations or coordinated liquidations. In a transnational corpo
rate structure, one can easily envision firms that could be handled
most efficiently on a country-by-country basis.3° Firms with global op
erations typically establish legally distinct companies in each country
in which they do significant business. This global segmentation pro
vides each country with a discrete firm to focus on. On the one hand,
there may be firms that experience financial, but not economic, dis
tress, and whose constituent parts are so well integrated that any suc
cessful reorganization will need the active cooperation of all countries
in which the firm has an affiliate. On the other hand, some firms may
yield a higher return when administered on a territorial basis.
Stated somewhat differently, the universalist concern that the inef
ficient domestic race to the assets will reoccur at the international
level rests on a flawed analogy. Each nation already has in place a
domestic bankruptcy system that prevents a destructive race to the as
sets located in that jurisdiction. For the analogy to carry through, the
transnational firm has to generate excess value from the combination
of its constituent members. In a world where we routinely see firms
changing business strategy and selling off subsidiaries, it is, at the least,
not obvious that such a relationship exists for a substantial number of
firms.

28.

See id.

at 803.

29. See Frank H. Easterbrook, ls Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411,
414 (1990); Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 4, at 56-59; Schwartz, supra note 4, at
1812-14.
30. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra
pra note 6, at 742-59.

note 8, at 27-32; LoPucki,

Cooperation, su
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The universalist claim rests on the assumption that for transna
tional firms, integration of their world-wide operations is more com
mon than having its constituent parts run as individual entities. This
claim alone is not necessarily false (although conceivably it could be).
But clearly not all firms would benefit from a universalist system. The
advantage of the bankruptcy selection clause approach is that it allows
firms to sort themselves. Firms that would benefit from a single reor
ganization proceeding can place a term in the corporate charter of
each affiliate specifying which nation will adjudicate any insolvency
proceeding involving the firm. Firms with discrete operations can con
tract for a territorial approach by specifying in each corporate charter
that the country of incorporation will handle any bankruptcy situation
that may arise. Indeed, some transnational firms may well have some
constituent parts that form part of an integrated world-wide operation
and some that do not. In such a case, the integrated entities could
each select the same jurisdiction to handle an insolvency while having
the remaining entities select the nation in which they are incorporated.
In other words, the bankruptcy selection clause approach allows firms
to tailor the transnational insolvency system to best meet their par
ticular needs. As such, it provides more gains than either universalism
or territorialism.
Another cost of universalism that has yet to be recognized in the
literature relates to the interaction between bankruptcy law and gen
eral corporate law. Often a nation's general corporate law works in
tandem with its bankruptcy law. For example, the American corpo
rate governance/bankruptcy system relies on what Professor David
Skeel has termed "ex post" correctives of managerial failure, whereas
the German and Japanese systems rely on "ex ante" correctives.31 The
details of the argument are not important for present purposes. What
is important is the general insight that a nation's corporate law and
bankruptcy law work together. Universalism threatens to destroy the
symmetry of these systems by superimposing a bankruptcy regime
premised on one type of corporate governance system onto a different
corporate governance system. By disrupting the harmony that would
otherwise exist between bankruptcy and corporate law, universalism
threatens the system of laws that nations have developed to police
firm performance.
Bankruptcy selection clauses, unlike universalism, respect the inte
grated nature of corporate law and bankruptcy law. Firms can ensure
that the bankruptcy regime they select comports with the governing
corporate law. Selecting a bankruptcy law from another country does
not necessarily lessen the interactive effect of bankruptcy law and cor
porate law. Only selecting incompatible bankruptcy laws results in

31.

See

Skeel, supra note 2, at 1328.
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this harm. To the extent that compatible bankruptcy and corporate
laws increase firm value, bankruptcy selection clauses will tend to
maintain the balance between the two systems.
Professor LoPucki raises yet another concern, which applies to
both the universalist and bankruptcy selection clause approaches. He
argues that the informational demands that these systems place on
creditors overwhelm any potential gains. Creditors who wish to price
all relevant terms of the loan will have to ascertain which law will gov
ern the insolvency of the firm. In the case of universalism, the credi
tors will have to ascertain the "home" country, and then plumb its
bankruptcy law. In a world where courts enforce bankruptcy selection
clauses, the creditors will have to look at the corporate charter, figure
out which jurisdiction has been selected, and then delve into the intri
cacies of that nation's insolvency law.32
Professor LoPucki raises a valid point; universalism and bank
ruptcy clause selection would increase the cost of drafting initial
lending agreements, especially for those lenders who lend solely to
domestic firms. To conclude that these costs justify abandoning either
of the proposed alternatives to territorialism, however, requires a
finding that these costs exceed the benefits offered by each system.
Professors Guzman and Westbrook have responded to Professor
LoPucki on behalf of the universalists.33
As to the bankruptcy selection clause approach, Professor
Westbrook joins Professor LoPucki in asserting that the information
demands of the system would rob it of any potential benefit.34 The
question of whether high information costs will swamp any potential
benefits boils down to one of intuition. My own sense is that Profes
sors LoPucki and Westbrook drastically overstate the costs of con
tracting. It will not be difficult to determine, under a bankruptcy se
lection clause system, what jurisdiction has been selected to administer
a firm's bankruptcy. The firm borrowing the money will simply show
the lender the relevant provision in its corporate charter.

32

See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6,

at 738-39.

33. See Andrew T. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000); Westbrook, The Global Solution, supra note 9, at 2307-25.
34. Both Professor LoPucki and Professor Westbrook trot out the claim that the bank
ruptcy selection clause approach relies on the assumption of perfect markets with zero tran
saction costs. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2242; Westbrook,
The Global Solution, supra note 9, at 2302-03. As should be clear by now, there is no such
reliance. Rather, the claim is that, including transaction costs, efficiency is improved
through firm selection rather than government fiat. See generally James W. Bowers, The
Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Com
ment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Eco
nomic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 110-15
(1995) (considering various impediments to implementing a selection regime); Rasmussen, A
New Approach, supra note 8, at 20-26 (similar).
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The largest potential cost is getting a handle on the law of the
country selected. This cost, of course, will only be relevant when firms
have selected jurisdictions other than the one in which they are lo
cated. Even for these firms, this cost may not loom large. It is, of
course, difficult to predict with certainty what selection patterns would
emerge in a regime of bankruptcy selection clauses. We currently live
in a world of mandated bankruptcy regimes, and thus we have no de
finitive evidence of how firms would act were they granted the free
dom to select the governing bankruptcy law.
Yet it is quite possible that a certain, small number of nations
could end up being viewed as having the "best" bankruptcy law. In
deed, such a situation could develop precisely because of the informa
tional concerns expressed by Professor LoPucki. Debtors, to the ex
tent that they are dealing with fully adjusting creditors, will bear the
costs that the creditors will incur when they investigate the bankruptcy
jurisdiction that the debtor has selected. Debtors thus have an incen
tive to keep these costs to a minimum. Once lenders become familiar
with the workings of a few countries' bankruptcy laws, debtors will
have an incentive to select either the law of their home jurisdiction or
one of these well-known laws so as to hold down their cost of credit.35
Indeed, similar potential information problems exist today in re
lated legal areas, and firms have been able to cope with these prob
lems in a satisfactory manner. For example, although American cor
porations can incorporate in any one of fifty states, the system has not
been bogged down in an informational quagmire. First, most corpora
tions incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware.36 Thus,
lenders that lend only to local businesses need only be familiar with
their own state's corporate code and that of Delaware. Large credi
tors, in contrast, will lend to a number of firms that are governed by a
number of different corporation codes. Despite these myriad sources
of law and the potential informational problems that in theory could
arise, things work pretty well. Indeed, a recent study has confirmed
that Delaware corporations, on average, have a higher value than do
corporations from other states.37 In other words, firms have focused
on a single jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction appears to be the one that
maximizes firm value.

35. For a discussion of the possible network effects that might lead to adoption of a sin
gle state's law, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Con
tracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
36. See Robert Daines, How Firms Choose Domicile: Some Evidence on State Compe
tition and the Demand for Corporate Law (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
37. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (2000) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
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A second example that suggests that informational problems may
not be debilitating is the general enforceability of forum-selection
clauses and choice-of-law clauses. In the international context, these
provisions are routinely enforced. This enforcement raises the exact
same theoretical problems that Professors LoPucki and Westbrook
raise in regard to bankruptcy selection clauses. Despite these theo
retical problems, choice of law scholars generally endorse the prevail
ing practice.38 Thus, while there exists no guarantee that the gains of a
bankruptcy selection regime would not be overwhelmed by informa
tion costs, private selection has increased efficiency in situations that
appear roughly similar.
Professor LoPucki also argues that information costs regarding
changes in a firm's selection will be large. Extant practices in corpo
rate law generally belie this assertion as well. Not surprisingly, firms
change both the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated and the
provisions of their charter with some frequency. These changes have
not frustrated the operations of the securities markets. Thus, one
should be suspicious of the assertion that the information costs of
changing the bankruptcy selection will be prohibitive. Indeed, a sim
ple solution exists. Creditors in their lending agreements can require
that they be informed of changes in the bankruptcy selection.
To be sure, there are transaction costs associated with bankruptcy
selection clauses. Yet that is true of all proposals in this area. Profes
sor LoPucki's cooperative territorialism has such costs as well. He en
visions extensive negotiations after insolvency among the various ju
risdictions that have control over portions of the multinational
enterprise. While Professor LoPucki elides over the point, these nego
tiations would be expensive. Moreover, one can imagine that in at
least some instances the negotiations could end in an impasse. Con
stituent parts of a corporate enterprise that should be reorganized as a
single entity may be liquidated individually. Conversely, jurisdictions
may agree to cooperate where separate administration would promise
a larger return to the creditors. Parties beforehand may thus have dif
ficulty predicting the outcome of future negotiations. All this suggests
that the costs of cooperative territorialism may well exceed those of a
bankruptcy selection clause regime.
Professor Guzman raises a final concern with bankruptcy selection
clauses. He notes that domestic bankruptcy law does not allow for
firm choice. Thus, creditors anticipate that their claims will be re
solved by domestic bankruptcy law. Once the firm becomes multina-

38. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consen
sual Adjudicating Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Michael E.
Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 51 (1992).
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tional, however, these expectations would be defeated. The ability to
defeat these expectations would, in tum, distort investment choices.
The optimal solution, as recognized by Professor Guzman, would
be to extend a choice-based regime to domestic law. Failing this, the
appropriate response is a system of constraints on how a charter can
be changed. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere,39 a system that pro
vides for firm choice has to allow for needed change while at the same
time restrict opportunistic amendment. Two solutions come readily to
mind, and there probably are others as well. First, one can require a
lag time between when an amendment is made and when it becomes
effective. This simple rule guards against selection changes driven by
imminent financial distress. Second, creditors can put a term in their
lending agreement declaring changes to be a default. This term would
give the lender the opportunity to terminate or renegotiate its rela
tionship with the debtor if it believes that the change adversely affects
its loan.40 These constraints would ensure that changes in the govern
ing bankruptcy selection would enhance efficiency.
In sum, a regime in which bankruptcy selection clauses are rou
tinely enforced should perform better than one based on either uni
versalism or territorialism.

II.

THE ILLUSIVE PROBLEM OF DEBTOR HAYENS

Two other objections can be leveled against a regime of bank
ruptcy selection clauses. The first is that such a regime would create
an incentive for some jurisdictions to become "debtor havens." The
second is that it will allow firms to undo noneconomic policy choices
made by the appropriate domestic government. This section ad
dresses the first of these concerns.
Professor LoPucki has raised the specter that an international legal
system that routinely enforces bankruptcy selection clauses will create
"debtor havens."41 The term implies derision, but to assess the merits
of this criticism one must articulate exactly what a debtor's haven
would be. Such a haven must have the attribute that it transfers value
from creditors to debtors. To adumbrate the scope of this concern, it
is useful to employ Professor Guzman's distinction among fully ad
justing, weakly nonadjusting, and strongly nonadjusting creditors.42
This classification helps isolate which creditors - if any - can sys-

39. See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 4, at 116-21; Rasmussen & Skeel, supra
note 34, at 113-15.
40. See generally George G. Triantis & Ronald T. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interac
tive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (explaining the role of covenants in
lending agreements).
41.

See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6,

42

See

at 739.

Guzman, supra note 33, at 2180-81, 2182.
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tematically be disadvantaged in a way that would spur the creation of
debtor's havens.
The first category of creditors - fully adjusting creditors - cannot
be systematically shortchanged via a bankruptcy selection clause.
These creditors price their transactions such that each transaction of
fers, ex ante, a market rate of return. Any attempt to select a bank
ruptcy regime that transferred money to the debtor from these credi
tors after the filing of a bankruptcy petition would result in an
offsetting transfer to these creditors from the debtor at the time they
agreed to the transaction. To the extent that fully adjusting creditors
affect the analysis at all, their existence would lead the debtor to select
the efficient bankruptcy regime so that it would reduce its cost of
credit.
To the extent that the problem of debtor's havens exists, it must
revolve round the ability of debtors (with the aid of a facilitating coun
try)43 to exploit systematically either weakly nonadjusting creditors or
strongly nonadjusting creditors or both. The distinction between these
two types of creditors captures the fact that some creditors, while not
adjusting the individual rate of interest they charge to debtors, none
theless can adjust their overall interest rate so as to earn a competitive
rate of return; other creditors, in contrast, cannot change their lending
pattern to respond to any change in bankruptcy policy.
Professor Guzman quite rightly notes that for weakly nonadjusting
creditors there is a subsidization from low-risk debtors to high-risk
debtors.44 The basic insight here is that since all debtors are charged
the same interest rate that reflects a blend of the riskiness of the entire
borrowing pool, those debtors with a lower risk of default than the
blended average pay a higher rate of interest than they would if the
interest rate were based on an individualized determination. Con
versely, those debtors with a higher risk of default pay a lower rate
than they otherwise would. Professor Guzman also demonstrates that
weakly nonadjusting creditors cannot be systematically disadvantaged
by any given bankruptcy regime. Regardless of the regime, they will
be able to price their loans so as to obtain a market rate of return.

43. LoPucki has not articulated the reasons why nations may tailor their law to attract
debtors to select them as the situs of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the case of domestic cor
porations law, theorists have identified ways in which Delaware has committed itself to pro
viding the law that corporations desire. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory
of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927, 1939-45 (1998);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 469, 490 (1987); see also Robert K. Rasmussen & Randal
S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (explaining how competition among bankruptcy judges for
desirable cases may affect their handling of cases). Indeed, if a country benefits by having a
firm select it as the site of its bankruptcy, the race would be to the top. As the text explains,
firms, on balance, would benefit from selecting the most efficient bankruptcy regime.
44. See

Guzman, supra note 33, at 2187-88.
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To say that these creditors are not systematically disadvantaged
does not mean that debtors will necessarily select the regime that
would most advance social welfare. This divergence between private
incentives and the public good may arise due to a collective action
problem. Debtors, as a group, would benefit from the selection of a
bankruptcy regime that lowered the overall price of credit. Each
debtor, however, would have the individual incentive to select a re
gime that distributed value from weakly nonadjusting creditors to the
debtor. This incentive arises because the debtor does not bear the full
cost of its actions, a situation that does not present itself when the
debtor deals with a fully adjusting creditor. When borrowing funds
from a weakly nonadjusting creditor, the debtor that has selected a
bankruptcy regime that, ex post, transfers value from the creditor to
the debtor gains the entire value that it appropriates from the weakly
nonadjusting creditor. At the same time, its own decision does not no
ticeably affect the rate of interest that the weakly nonadjusting credi
tor charges. To be sure, in the aggregate, the decisions of all debtors
will affect the rate of interest, but no single debtor will view its deci
sion as affecting that rate. Thus, the dominant strategy for all debtors
is to select a bankruptcy regime that transfers value to debtors from
weakly nonadjusting creditors. The optimal regime for an individual
debtor thus does not transfer value from a fully adjusting creditor, but
does expropriate value from weakly adjusting creditors.
As with the informational overload problem identified by Profes
sor LoPucki, one must try to gauge the magnitude of this problem. As
the adage goes "My theory beats your practice." Thus, to make a
valid assessment of the competing proposals, one needs some sense as
to how many weakly nonadjusting creditors exist and how easy it is to
craft a bankruptcy regime that transfers value from them to the
debtor. While it is difficult to ascertain the number of such creditors
today, one would expect the category of weakly nonadjusting creditors
to shrink dramatically in the future. A rational creditor is weakly
nonadjusting when the cost of making individualized credit determina
tions exceeds the benefits of such a determination, and recent devel
opments in credit markets have made such determinations easier to
make. First, transnational firms tend to be large firms, and there is a
wealth of data available on such firms at a low cost. For example,
creditors can readily obtain information on such firms from services
such as Dun & Bradstreet. Other innovations include credit scoring,
which allows a lender to process a loan application in a matter of min
utes.45 Indeed, the entire thrust of recent developments in private
markets is the steady decrease of the costs of obtaining and processing

45. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997).
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information.46 As creditors can obtain information at lower costs, they
gain the incentive to become fully adjusting.
Competition forces creditors to become fully adjusting when it is
cost justified to do so. A competing creditor who can identify low-risk
debtors can offer those debtors a lower interest rate than can a weakly
adjusting creditor. Creditors make money by extending credit, and
thus seek out potential lending opportunities. To be sure, competition
may not drive all creditors to become fully adjusting. There may be a
residual class of debtors for whom it is not cost justified to offer credit
terms on an individualized basis. Nevertheless, as the amount of a
debtor's debt held by fully adjusting creditors increases, the debtor's
incentive to make the most efficient bankruptcy selection increases as
well.
Added to the uncertainty as to the number of weakly nonadjusting
creditors in the transnational context is the difficulty involved for a
bankruptcy regime to target such creditors for expropriation. Bank
ruptcy laws tend to distinguish between secured creditors and unse
cured creditors, but this distinction does not map onto the distinction
between fully adjusting and weakly nonadjusting creditors. Some se
cured creditors, such as those who take a security interest in the goods
that they sell, may be weakly nonadjusting. Some unsecured creditors,
such as financial institutions making operating loans, may be fully ad
justing. Thus, even if the amount of weakly nonadjusting creditors is
large, it is far from certain that bankruptcy laws can be targeted so as
to transfer value from weakly adjusting creditors to debtors on the one
hand, while at the same time not to transfer such value from fully ad
justing creditors on the other. To the extent that a bankruptcy system
inefficiently attempts to transfer value away from fully adjusting credi
tors, the debtor will pay the cost of this inefficiency.
In light of these observations, the concern over debtor havens must
be a concern about the exploitation of strongly nonadjusting creditors.
These are creditors for whom changes in the applicable legal rules do
not alter their pricing behavior. Professor Guzman treats the govern
ment as a strongly nonadjusting creditor,47 but such treatment seems
inappropriate. Governments charge an interest rate on their "loan,"
and they set this rate by statute.48 To be sure, institutional reasons
may exist that explain why the selected rate does not ensure a market
rate of return, but it is these institutional reasons, and not the lack of

46. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J.
2225 {1999).
47. See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2183. Professor Guzman recognizes, however, that
his classification of the government as a strongly nonadjusting creditor is debatable. See id.
at 2183 n.28.
48. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 660l{a) (assessing interest on late taxes) & 662l{a) (setting
rate at federal short-term rate plus 3%).
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an ability to set an appropriate interest rate, that ensures that the gov
ernment is not fully compensated.
In other words, governments
clearly have the ability to set a fully compensatory rate of interest, and
thus they should not be considered strongly nonadjusting creditors.
The one group of true strongly nonadjusting creditors is tort vic
tims. The concern raised by Professor LoPucki over how this group
would fare under a legal system that routinely enforces bankruptcy
selection clauses presents the most formidable objection to the imple
mentation of a regime based on private ordering. Professor LoPucki
asserts that a system of bankruptcy selection clauses would worsen the
plight of tort victims because debtors will systematically select jurisdic
tions that provide the worse possible treatment of such claims.49 He
identifies six possible ways in which tort creditors may be disadvan
taged in a bankruptcy clause selection regime. First, they may receive
a lower priority than they would in a territorial system. This would
occur where debtors select forums that accord lower priority to tort
claims than does the forum that would otherwise administer the bank
ruptcy proceeding. Second, Professor LoPucki suggests that tort
creditors may face a greater inconvenience when seeking recovery on
their claims because debtors will select jurisdictions that make it more
inconvenient to pursue one's claim. These two arguments relate to the
selected jurisdiction's bankruptcy law's treatment of tort creditors.
Professor LoPucki's other four reasons for concluding that a bank
ruptcy clause selection regime would lead to an increase in the amount
of torts committed - firms would select nations that give low verdicts,
that have substantive tort law that disfavors tort victims, that have
procedural impediments to tort claimants, and that do not have a suf
ficient number of plaintiffs' attorneys - all relate to the contours of
the selected country's tort law system.
Professor LoPucki's first assertion, that debtors will use bank
ruptcy selection clauses to strategically reduce the value of the claims
of tort creditors, implicitly relies on the assumption that such manipu
lation carries with it the possibility of substantial gains to the debtor.
This assumption is difficult to justify. To see why, one must begin with
the extant treatment of tort creditors. American law both provides for
limited liability and accords tort claims priority status equal to that of
consensual unsecured debt. Academics agree that such treatment falls
short of the ideal.5° From an efficiency perspective, law and economics
scholars agree that, to the extent that firms do not internalize the full

49. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1896·
902 (1994).
50. See, e.g., id. at 1898-99; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857, 882-83 (1996).
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cost of potential torts, they have too little incentive to take care.51
Those who view fairness as the overriding normative goal of bank
ruptcy similarly conclude that tort victims should receive better treat
ment than they currently do.52 The relevant question for the debate
over transnational insolvencies is whether a bankruptcy selection
clause regime would exacerbate the problems inherent in existing law.
As an initial matter, it may be that few transnational firms would
focus on potential tort liability at all. Each firm differs in the potential
that it has for inflicting uncompensated injury on third parties. In
most situations, firms will have insurance sufficient to cover the claims
of the few tort victims it may have.53 When a firm files for bankruptcy,
the proceeds of insurance policies go directly to the injured claimants,
despite their nominal status as unsecured creditors.54 Thus, when ade
quate insurance exists, tort creditors are compensated in full despite
the nominal low priority that their claims receive in bankruptcy.
There certainly will be cases where a firm engages in activities that
carry the potential to create tort claims that exceed the combination of
their equity and their insurance coverage. It is this subset of firms that
must form the basis for Professor LoPucki's fear. Yet the room for
strategic manipulation of bankruptcy law to inflict loss on this group is
quite small. I am unaware of any country that follows the prescription
of most scholars and grants tort creditors priority over the consensual
creditors of the firm; at best, nations allow tort creditors to share pro
rata with unsecured creditors; at worst, they place tort creditors below
unsecured creditors. In other words, to say that there is a problem
with firms opportunistically selecting bankruptcy jurisdictions based
on the differing treatment accorded to tort creditors, one has to iden
tify jurisdictions that accord different treatment to tort creditors. It
would make little sense for debtors to flee to a foreign jurisdiction to
ensure that tort creditors have a low priority when they are already
accorded such treatment at home.55

51. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 826 (1994);
F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1415-19 (1986); David
W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 164349 (1991).
52. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 541, 569 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy
making in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 354 (1993); see also Robert K.
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 31-35 (arguing that a Rawlsian legislature would accord better treatment to tort creditors
than does current law).
53. See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing:
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1380-88 (1998).
54.

A Response to Lynn LoPucki's

See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 378 (1988).

55. To the extent that a government does decide to accord its tort victinls better treat
ment than currently exists, it can ensure that this priority is respected by granting these vic
tims a property right in the firm's assets. See infra Part III.

2270

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2252

To be sure, Professor LoPucki has identified jurisdictions that treat
tort claimants even worse than does American law.56 Yet, the effect of
the marginal lowering in priority between the United States and these
other countries will not likely be great. Professors Bebchuk and Fried,
echoing claims made by Professor LoPucki, have argued that a firm's
ability to issue secured debt can lead to a lowering of precaution. This
decrease in the level of precaution is in addition to the decrease
caused by limited liability.57 The linchpin of the argument is that by
ensuring that the secured creditor can take all of the remaining assets
of the firm, regardless of whether the firm takes cost-justified precau
tions, the firm will pay a lower rate of interest. This lower rate of in
terest results because priority ensures that when a firm becomes insol
vent, the remaining assets go to the secured lender and are not shared
with the tort claimants. If the secured creditor had to share the assets
with tort creditors, it would have to compensate for this loss by
charging a higher rate of interest initially.
Translating this argument to the context of transnational insolven
cies takes something of an effort. As an initial matter, Professors
Bebchuk and Fried were careful not to claim that the distortion they
find caused by secured credit in the domestic context is a large one.58
When one runs through the argument in the context of transnational
insolvencies where the shift is between unsecured creditors and tort
claimants, any distortion becomes smaller still. The economic argu
ment for territorialism based on preserving tort creditor priority would
start with the observation that American law requires tort creditors to
share on a pro rata basis with unsecured creditors. Unsecured credi
tors, be they fully adjusting or weakly nonadjusting, would charge a
higher rate of interest than they would if they had priority over the
tort claims. This higher rate of interest would reflect the fact that they
would have to share the unencumbered assets of the firm with tort
claimants. Debtors could reduce this cost by selecting a jurisdiction
that placed tort creditors below consensual claimants.
Such reduction, however, is only partial. Initially, it is unclear, on
average, the extent to which assets are even available for distribution
to any unsecured. Thus, there may be limited room to maneuver in
this area. Moreover, the debtor would not achieve the full benefit of
any maneuvering in which it engaged. Only fully adjusting unsecured
creditors would take account of the debtor's selected bankruptcy ju
risdiction when making their lending decisions. Partially adjusting un
secured creditors, by definition, would not react to a debtor's selection

56.

See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra

57.

See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 50, at 898-900.

58.

note 6, at nn.61-63.

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se
cured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV.

1279, 1320 {1997).
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of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that a debtor will select
a jurisdiction so as to lower the priority of tort claims, it has to be the
case that the debtor expects to gain in its dealings with fully adjusting
unsecured creditors.
Yet this state of affairs raises a puzzle: If a fully adjusting unse
cured creditor is willing to confer an advantage on a debtor in ex
change for having priority over tort victims, then why does it not sim
ply become a secured creditor and get that same advantage? In other
words, for Professor LoPucki's concern to be valid, it must be the case
that the cost of becoming a secured creditor exceeds the cost of
learning about a bankruptcy regime selected by the debtor. Given
that the cost of becoming a secured creditor is not excessive,59 it is
hard to imagine a debtor selecting a bankruptcy jurisdiction simply to
move tort claims further down the priority ladder.
Even if one could identify a benefit that a debtor could obtain
through priority dilution that it could not otherwise get, it is still far
from certain that debtors would grab this benefit. The priority dilu
tion that Professor LoPucki identifies forms only a small part of the
selected country's bankruptcy law. The efficacy of the remaining law
will more likely drive the selection choice. The benefits that can be
achieved by selecting the most efficient insolvency law will most likely
far exceed any benefits that could be garnered by subrogating the
claims of tort victims. The savings promised by selecting the most effi
cient regime obtain in every insolvency case; the gains generated by
lowering priority only occur in cases with substantial tort liability,
which are infrequent. Thus, one would expect that debtors would be
more concerned with selecting an efficacious bankruptcy law than they
would be with lowering tort creditor priority.
Despite the unlikely event that a debtor will select a bankruptcy
jurisdiction simply in order to lower the priority of tort claims, I still
endorse a requirement that any bankruptcy regime selected by a firm
accord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what they
achieve in their home country.6() This endorsement, while not central
to the entire bankruptcy selection scheme, flows from efficiency con
cerns.61 As Professor LoPucki notes, in theory this requirement may
prevent some firms from selecting a jurisdiction because it places tort
creditors in a lower position than they would be under the law of their
home country. Yet, once lawyers and judges in a country became
aware that their country was not being selected solely because of its

59. See Ronald
625, 658-68 (1997).

J. Mann,

Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110

HARV. L. REV.

60. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 35.
61. It is also the case that lowering the priority of tort victims would strike many as un
fair. To the extent that this a salient concern, my requirement that the country selected not
lower the priority of tort creditors would respond to this concern.
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shoddy treatment of tort creditors, these actors would have to attempt
to have the country change its laws so as to raise the priority of tort
claims. Given that all seem to decry placing tort creditors near the
bottom of a firm's capital structure, such an incentive should be ap
plauded.
Professor LoPucki also posits, in his second assertion, that firms
would select jurisdictions simply to make it difficult for tort victims to
pursue their claims. The easy response to this supposition is that this
strategy would impose greater costs on the debtor than it would on the
putative tort claimants. This response stems from the fact that if the
firm files for bankruptcy, it must deal with this jurisdiction. It is hard
to see how a jurisdiction could be inconvenient for the tort creditors,
but not the firm and its managers as well. Also, the selected jurisdic
tion would probably be inconvenient for the firm's fully adjusting
creditors. The debtor thus would bear the full cost of its own incon
venience, plus, indirectly, the costs that the choice imposed on the
fully adjusting creditors. Thus, inconvenience is a two-edged sword.
Given that in most bankruptcy cases there are far more attorneys for
debtors and consensual creditors than there are for tort victims, it
seems fanciful to suggest that firms would put themselves and all oth
ers to such inconvenience just to ensure that, should any tort creditors
arise, they would find it inconvenient as well.
The remaining four problems identified by Professor LoPucki all
involve situations where the jurisdiction in which the firm commits to
file its bankruptcy also has a tort system that is less hospitable to tort
claimants than is the firm's home jurisdiction. Again, it is far from
clear the extent to which this possibility is a substantial obstacle to im
plementing a bankruptcy clause selection system. Implicit in Professor
LoPucki's concern is the assumption that the selected jurisdiction
would resolve the tort dispute according to its own substantive law.
But commonly accepted choice-of-law principles require the court that
has jurisdiction over a case to apply the law that has the "most signifi
cant relationship" to the alleged tort. 62 It is thus unlikely that a debtor
could use a bankruptcy selection clause so as to change the substantive
law by which its conduct would be judged.
To be sure, the "norms" of the selected jurisdiction may be such
that, even if the jurisdiction applied the more plaintiff-friendly sub
stantive law of another jurisdiction, the final amount assigned to a tort
victim's claim would be lower than if the claim had been litigated in
the other jurisdiction.63 Even allowing for this possibility, however, it

62 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (stating that
court should apply law of the jurisdiction that has the "most significant relationship" to the
alleged tort).
63. For a discussion of the possible divergence between legal rules and the actual pre
vailing legal culture, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in
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is hard to ascertain why this divergence would drive the selection of a
bankruptcy jurisdiction over all of the other factors that a firm would
rationally consider. First, for it even to matter at the margin, the se
lected jurisdiction would have to assign a sufficiently different value to
the tort claims, such that the debtor would remain solvent where it
otherwise would be insolvent; to the shareholders and the managers
who represent their interests, being a little insolvent is the same as
being a lot insolvent. Second, selecting a foreign regime makes a
bankruptcy proceeding more expensive. If those in charge of the firm
believed it would produce significant benefits, they would plausibly
make such a selection. The off chance that the firm will incur substan
tial tort liability, and that the selected jurisdiction will systematically
undervalue the tort claims, however, simply does not seem to provide
a large ex ante benefit.
In sum, while there are easily identifiable efficiency gains in al
lowing firms to select the jurisdiction that would handle any future in
solvency proceeding, the cost of creating debtor havens is much more
difficult to locate. Firms are more likely to choose the regime that
best handles financial distress than they are to choose the one that
best frustrates the claims of nonadjusting creditors.
That firms will tend to select bankruptcy systems which minimize
the cost of financial distress suggests that Professor Westbrook's
dream of a single law administered by a single legal system may not be
the ideal goal in international bankruptcy law. Though I initially en
dorsed a multinational treaty that would establish bankruptcy proce
dures from which firms could select, I now favor a system whereby
firms select from the bankruptcy laws of the various countries. My
change stems from concerns of institutional competence. I question
the ability of any single group, no matter how well intentioned, to craft
an ideal bankruptcy procedure. Moreover, it is unclear how respon
sive such an institution would be to changes that were needed as the
economy evolves. On balance, it may be that countries would find it
in their interest to have their bankruptcy laws adopted by firms. For
example, local attorneys would desire the business that a major bank
ruptcy generates. To the extent that nations competed for bankruptcy
business, and debtors selected their bankruptcy jurisdiction based on
the jurisdiction's efficiency in handling financial distress, we could ex
pect nations to produce more effective bankruptcy laws. Such laws, of
course, may be far from perfect. The claim here is only that they
would be better than those produced by any other institution. A re
gime of bankruptcy selection clauses thus might not only allow firms
to select the best of current law, but also would lead to a general in
crease in the quality of extant law.
Lawyers' Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996). Of course, it may be that the selected ju
risdiction has norms that generate a higher amount.
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III. FRUSTRATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY
One problem confronting both the universalist and the bankruptcy
selection scholars is that their claims rest on efficiency, and domestic
bankruptcy law clearly is not driven solely by a concern with effi
ciency. To be sure, differences among various countries' domestic
bankruptcy laws do not necessarily imply that these countries embrace
differing goals. Rather, these differences may be explained as a dis
agreement over which procedure best promotes efficiency. Indeed,
there is a robust debate in the academic literature over which set of
rules would best promote efficiency.64 Given this lack of academic
consensus, it is no surprise that countries have not decided which set
of bankruptcy rules promises to maximize firm value.
These disagreements over implementing the efficiency norm
should not affect the selection of a transnational bankruptcy rule. In a
territorial regime, each country supplies its own solution. In a univer
salist regime, one country's law will govern, but the other countries
have no basis for complaining - their law will govern in other situa
tions, and in all cases the law applied will be attempting to achieve the
same goal.65 Indeed, to the extent that the different laws are just dif
ferent attempts to reach the same goals, countries could learn from the
experiences of other nations and update their law accordingly. For
example, Canada not too long ago revamped its insolvency law to
move it closer to the insolvency law of the United States.66 Finally, in
a bankruptcy selection regime, firms will select the law or laws that
they believe are most efficient. Indeed, this regime best comports with
the countries' goals of promoting efficiency. Thus, the mere fact that
bankruptcy laws differ across nations is not a basis for rejecting the
bankruptcy selection or even the universalist solutions to the problem
of transnational insolvencies.
But there are some situations where the governing legislature has
sacrificed efficiency for another goal, usually that of redistribution.
Everyone has their favorite example - workers in Mexico, fishermen
in the United States, and so on. Territorialism undoubtedly respects
these choices. If the United States government has decided to protect
United States fishermen, the territorial regime respects this decision.
The same holds true for workers in Mexico.

64. See sources cited in note 4.
65. Cf Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 33944 (1990)
(explaining how states can improve the advancement of their own policies through reciproc
ity).
66. For an argument that this revision departed from the goal of efficiency, see F.H.
Buckley, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 301, 306-08 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
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It may appear that either universalism or bankruptcy selection
clauses would frustrate these noneconomic policy choices. On reflec
tion, however, once a government has made a choice to favor a certain
claimant, neither universalism nor contractual choice should stand as a
barrier to that choice. To see why, it is important to recognize that
bankruptcy regimes generally recognize property interests created by
nonbankruptcy law. When a creditor gets a valid security interest in
land under local law, that interest will be valid regardless of where a
bankruptcy proceeding takes place. Thus, if a government believes
that a certain creditor should be paid before all others, it can accom
plish this goal by granting that creditor a valid security interest in the
domestic assets of the firm. Failure to recognize such property rights
would be grounds for a domestic court to ignore the edicts of a foreign
jurisdiction under either a universalist or bankruptcy selection clause
approach.
That this mechanism would be effective is illustrated by its pres
ence in American bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes
and routinely enforces mechanics liens. These liens allow a creditor
who enhances the value of a piece of the debtor's property to have a
lien on that property. A holder of a mechanics lien can enforce that
lien in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, by creating such a lien, the
government has decided that that creditor should get paid first. Simi
larly, if a government decides that its workers need special protection,
it can create a lien to ensure that workers receive the wages that they
are due. Indeed, the United States does precisely this in situations
where workers have not been paid the minimum wage. Thus, to the
extent that a government wishes to ensure that one class of claimants
gets paid ahead of another, it has the means to effect this decision.
CONCLUSION
Transnational insolvencies raise issues of efficient resolution of fi
nancial distress and fidelity to policy decisions made by various na
tional legislatures and courts. The challenge for each country's do
mestic bankruptcy law is to select a choice of law rule that best
promotes efficiency and respects national choices. A regime of bank
ruptcy selection clauses can harness the incentives of firms to maxi
mize their value and, at the same time, can ensure that governmental
decisions to protect favored groups are honored. As such, it provides
the best means for resolving the insolvency problems raised by the in
creasingly transnational nature of firms.

